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Extraterritorial Application of The Alien
Tort Statute After Kiobel
Ranon Altman *
This article explores when corporations can be held liable under
the Alien Tort Statute for human rights abuses that are
committed outside of the United States. The Alien Tort Statute
grants the United States district courts jurisdiction for torts
committed against foreigners in violation of the law of nations.
While the Alien Tort Statute concerns international law, it does
not indicate whether the district courts have jurisdiction over
disputes that involve conduct outside of the United States.
In this article, I focus my analysis on the Supreme Court’s 2013
decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. That case
determined that the Alien Tort Statute only applies to “relevant
conduct” in the United States. In so deciding, the Court evoked a
statutory rule of interpretation called the presumption against
extraterritoriality, which dictates that unless a federal statute
indicates otherwise, it is to only be applied in the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States.
This article addresses questions that arise from the application
of the presumption against extraterritoriality to the Alien Tort
Statute. For example, do federal courts have jurisdiction over
claims in which conduct that does not constitute “relevant
conduct” under the ATS takes place in the United States, but the
international law violation (the “relevant conduct”) takes place
in a foreign country? Additionally, to what extent does it matter
for purposes of ATS jurisdiction that a defendant is a United
States corporation?
*
Articles and Comments Editor, University of Miami Business Law Review; Juris
Doctor Candidate 2016, University of Miami School of Law. I would like to thank
Professor Stephen J. Schnably for helping me craft this note.
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In the final portion of this Article, I propose alternative ways to
apply the presumption against extraterritoriality to the Alien
Tort Statute. I base this analysis on the Supreme Court’s
decision in Morrison v. National Australia Bank.
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INTRODUCTION

Over the past 35 years, following the Second Circuit’s decision in
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 1 victims of human rights abuse have invoked the
federal Alien Tort Statute (ATS) 2 to seek redress for violations of
international law. The ATS provides that “[t]he district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations or of a treaty of the United
States.” 3 It was enacted by the First Congress in 1789. 4
Human rights litigation under the ATS flourished after Filartiga. 5
Early post-Filartiga ATS cases involved wrongs committed by state
officials or quasi-state actors. 6 But ATS litigation soon expanded to
cover wrongs committed abroad by multinational corporations
(“MNCs”). Major multinational corporations, including Unocal, Royal
Dutch Petroleum, Pfizer, Del Monte, ExxonMobil, and others, found
themselves subject to ATS suits for violating human rights in foreign
countries. 7 Corporate defendants were accused of aiding and abetting
states that arbitrarily detained and tortured aliens, practiced child
slavery, 8 committed genocide, 9 or engaged in human experimentation
without consent. 10 For example, in Abdullahi, plaintiffs alleged that
Pfizer tested experimental antibiotics on Nigerian children without their
knowledge. 11

1

Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980).
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).
3
Id.
4
Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878.
5
See, e.g, Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Forti v.
Suarez-Mason, 627 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d
Cir. 1995); Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999).
6
See, e.g., Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 205 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (suit
against nine United States executive officials, including the former President Ronald
Reagan); Forti, 644 F. Supp. at 708 (suit against Argentinian general); Abebe-Jira v.
Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 846 (11th Cir. 1996) (suit against former Ethiopian government
official).
7
Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum, 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010); Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163 (2d Cir.
2009); Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc., 416 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 2005);
Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 69 F. Supp. 3d 75 (D.C. Cir. 2014); see generally Alan O.
Sykes, Corporate Liability for Extraterritorial Torts Under the Alien Tort Statute and
Beyond: An Economic Analysis, 100 GEO L.J. 2161 (2012); see generally Douglas M.
Branson, Holding Multinational Corporations Accountable? Achilles’ Heels in Alien Tort
Claims Act Litigation, 9 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 227 (2011).
8
Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2014).
9
Doe, 69 F. Supp. 3d at 75.
10
Abdullahi, 562 F.3d at 103.
11
Id.
2
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Recent years, however, have seen two major developments that
threaten to make corporate liability under the ATS a thing of the past.
The first concerns whether corporations can have tort liability under
international law. In 2010, the Second Circuit held that they cannot—
precluding suits against corporations under the ATS.12 The court
reasoned that corporate liability for international law violations is not a
common feature among the nations.13 The Second Circuit also warned
that because corporations are “often engines of their national
economies,” “rendering their assets into compensatory damages, punitive
damages, and . . . legal fees” would provoke international conflict. 14 The
Ninth Circuit rejected this view. That court explained that because many
treaties hold corporations liable for their torts, “it would create a bizarre
anomaly to immunize corporations from liability for the conduct of their
agents in lawsuits brought for ‘shockingly egregious violations of
universally recognized principles of international law.’”15 Other circuits
have also rejected the Second Circuit’s holding. 16
The Supreme Court was poised to resolve this split in Kiobel, having
granted certiorari on it. 17 Ultimately, however, the Court resolved the
case on a different ground 18—one that has created a second barrier to
corporate liability under the ATS. In Kiobel, the Supreme Court ruled
that the ATS is subject to the presumption against extraterritoriality. 19
Under this presumption, a federal statute only applies within the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States, unless the statute indicates
otherwise. 20 The presumption can be overcome, the Court held, only
through a test that considers the location of defendants’ conduct and the
force with which plaintiffs’ claims touch and concern the territory of the
United States. 21 Thus, for now, most lower courts accept the possibility
of corporate liability under the ATS, but all are bound by the Supreme
12

Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 120.
Id. at 143.
14
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 642 F.3d 268, 270 (2d Cir. 2011) (Jacobs,
C.J., concurring).
15
Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 57 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
16
Sykes, supra note 7, at 2162-63 (“The second circuit . . . concluded that corporations
cannot be held liable under the ATS, although the Seventh, Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C.
Circuits disagree.”).
17
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Co., 132 S. Ct. 472
(2011) (No. 10-1491).
18
See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2012); Roxanna
Altholz, Chronicle of a Death Foretold: The Future of U.S. Human Rights Litigation
Post-Kiobel, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1495, 1521 (2014) (explaining that after Kiobel it is still
unclear what courts may hear cases against U.S. corporate defendants).
19
Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.
20
EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991).
21
Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.
13
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Court’s determination that the presumption against extraterritoriality
applies to the ATS.
Since 2013, lower courts have been left with the difficult task of
interpreting the controlling language in the Court’s opinion. How broadly
or narrowly Kiobel is interpreted has major implications on corporate
liability under the ATS. If corporations cannot be liable under the ATS,
the United States may be silently communicating to the world that
corporations may operate at the expense of foreign nationals. 22
This article describes and analyzes the application of the Kiobel test
in the lower courts. In the first section of this article, I provide
information on the building blocks of my argument—the Alien Tort
Statute, the Presumption against Extraterritoriality, and the Supreme
Court’s decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. In the
following section, I analyze the Kiobel test and its application in the
lower courts. I then address whether the test properly administers the
presumption against extraterritoriality as it should apply in the context of
the ATS. Finally, I propose an application of the presumption against
extraterritoriality to the ATS that adopts the Supreme Court’s holding in
Morrison v. National Australia Bank.

II.

THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE

In 1789, the first Congress enacted the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) in
order to create a mechanism by which the United States could enforce
the law of nations. 23 The ATS dictates that “[t]he district courts shall
have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States.” 24 For almost 200 years after its enactment, the ATS lay
dormant—invoked twice in the 18th century, and only once more in the
next 167 years. 25 With the Second Circuit’s decision in Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala, the ATS was finally revived after much rest.26 In Filartiga,
22
See Mujica v. AirScan Inc., 771 F.3d 580, 619 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Piracy and its
modern-day equivalents, including torture and genocide, are of particular concern to the
sovereign . . . because failure to [take action] . . . might render the sovereign ‘an
accomplice or abetter of [its] subject’s crime, and draw[] upon [its] community the
calamities of foreign war.’”) (citing 4 W Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of
England 68 (1769)).
23
See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 877 (2d Cir. 1980).
24
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).
25
Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 18 (2011).
26
See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004); Eugene Kontrovich, Kiobel
Surprise: Unexpected By Scholars But Consistent with International Trends, 89 NOTRE
DAME L. REV 1671, 1674 (2014) (explaining that modern ATS litigation began with
Filartiga).
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the Court upheld application of the ATS for two Paraguayan plaintiffs. 27
They claimed that the defendant, a Paraguayan police inspector,
kidnapped and tortured their family member in Paraguay. 28 In coming to
his conclusion, Judge Kaufman explained that the law of nations is a part
of federal common law, and as such, torture committed against an alien,
a violation of the law of nations, falls within the court’s ATS
jurisdiction. 29 Filartiga marked the ATS’s entrance into “the modern
internationalized human rights movement that began after World War II
and flourished in the 1970’s.” 30 The opinion introduced a new way for
the victims of human rights abuse to seek redress in federal court. 31
Multinational corporations did not look favorably on this expansion
of ATS litigation for obvious reasons. 32 Nor did many commentators.
One called the expansion of ATS litigation to cover multinational
corporations an “awakening monster”—posing a “nightmare scenario”
that could have a “chilling impact” on foreign trade and investment and
interfere with United States foreign relations.33
In 1984—just four years after Filartiga—Judge Robert Bork’s
concurring opinion in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic 34 casted doubt
on the continuing viability of ATS actions against corporations. He
argued that because human rights law was unknown in 1789, the ATS
could not grant jurisdiction for claims alleging violations of
contemporary human rights norms. 35 Other courts rejected this narrow

27

Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 890.
Id. at 878.
29
Id. at 878, 885.
30
Beth Stephens, The Curious History of the Alien Tort Statute, 89 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1467, 1474 (2014).
31
See Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of 1789: A
Badge of Honor, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 461 (1989).
32
Ernest A. Young, Universal Jurisdiction, The Alien Tort Statute, and Transnational
Public-Law Litigation After Kiobel, 64 DUKE L.J. 1023, 1054 (2015) (“By implicating
large multinational corporations with substantial litigation budgets, the second wave of
ATS litigation pulled in sophisticated defense counsel.”).
33
GARY HUFBAUER & NICHOLAS MITROKOSTAS, AWAKENING MONSTER: THE ALIEN
TORT STATUTE OF 1789 (Inst. for Int’l Econ. ed., 2003); see also Stephens, supra note 30,
at 1474 (remarking that some commentators warned that recognizing corporate liability
within the ATS would have a devastating impact).
34
Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 799 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J.,
concurring).
35
For commentary see Bradford R. Clark, Tel-Oren, Filartiga, and the Meaning of the
Alien Tort Statute, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 177, 190 (arguing that the Supreme
Court’s opinion in Sosa and Kiobel has more in common with Bork’s concurrence than it
does with Filartiga); but see Julian Ku, John Yoo, Beyond Formalism in Foreign Affairs:
A Functional Approach to the Alien Tort Statute, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 153, 161 (2004)
(recognizing that commentators have argued that suits alleging violations of customary
28
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construction, 36 and Congress subsequently re-affirmed the availability of
the federal courts to hear claims of human rights violations abroad with
the enactment of the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991.37 In 2004,
the Supreme Court ruled that the ATS does provide jurisdiction for
violations of human rights norms that are “specific, universal, and
obligatory.” 38

A.

Congress’ Purpose in Enacting the ATS

The first Congress’ motivation behind enacting the ATS can never
be precisely known. 39 Theories, however, share in common the idea that
the statute was a “part of the protective armor designed to shield a young
and vulnerable nation in a dangerous and unpredictable world.” 40 But in
other respects, there is sharp division. One belief is that states within the
United States did not sufficiently appreciate the international
consequences that could arise from torts committed against aliens, such
as ambassadors, within United States territory. 41 If left unattended, such
torts could threaten the United States’ standing with other nations, 42 and
ultimately lead to war.43 Through this interpretation, Congress gave the
federal courts jurisdiction over international law wrongs committed in
the United States against foreigners as a protective measure. This was to

international law do not require a separate cause of action, because the First Congress
assumed that these violations could be brought under the general common law).
36
See Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1539 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (holding that
the Filartiga is more in line with principles of international law than Bork’s approach in
Tel-Oren); see also Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 180 (D. Mass. 1995) (noting
that Bork’s view is more restrictive than the plain language of the ATS).
37
Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992)
(provides an independent cause of action for individuals in cases of torture or
extrajudicial killings); see Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 132 S. Ct. 1702, 1708 (holding
that only natural persons can be liable under the TVPA, which is not necessarily true of
the ATS).
38
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 748 (2004).
39
See Burley, supra note 31, at 463.
40
Id. at 464.
41
Id. at 465; Stephens, supra note 30, at 1471 (“Prior to the adoption of the
Constitution, the leaders of the Confederation’s weak central government repeatedly
expressed concern about their inability to enforce international obligations.”).
42
See Burley, supra note 31, at 465.
43
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 715; Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (“There is evidence . . . that the intent of [the ATS] was to assure aliens access to
federal courts to vindicate any incident which, if mishandled by a state court, might
blossom into an international crisis.”); see Brief for Professors of International Law,
Foreign Relations Law and Federal Jurisdiction as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., (No. 10-11491), 2012 WL 3276505,
at *10.
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be accomplished by giving the federal judiciary “cognizance of all causes
in which the citizens of countries are concerned.”44
A different view has much broader implications. By this view, the
First Congress believed that addressing torts committed against
foreigners was essential in order for the United States to become a fully
functioning member of the international community. 45 In other words, it
was the United States’ international duty to entertain suits alleging
offenses against citizens of other nations.46 Indeed, under this approach,
the United States could only become a nation among nations if it
complied with the laws governing other sovereigns. 47

B.

Causes of Action Under the ATS

In Sosa, Justice Souter held that the ATS is a jurisdictional statute 48
that does not grant judges the power to “mold substantive law.”49 He
further found that the drafters of the ATS recognized a modest number of
international law violations as claims under federal law, over which the
ATS was to provide jurisdiction. 50 In 1789 these claims included
violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and
piracy. 51 Justice Souter reasoned that historical materials suggest that the
statute was not a stillborn and was meant to have practical effect as soon
as it came into existence.52
Justice Souter also decided that the ATS is not limited to claims that
would have been recognized as international law violations in 1789. He
held that a court is able to recognize a new cause of action under the
ATS, if that violation “rest[s] on a norm of international character
accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity
comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms we have
recognized.” 53 International violations are actionable under the ATS if
44

Burley, supra note 31, at 465.
Id. at 484.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 713 (holding that ATS is a jurisdictional state because it was
placed in § 9 of the Judiciary Act, which was concerned with federal-court jurisdiction);
but see Eugene Kontrovich, Kiobel Surprise: Unexpected By Scholars But Consistent
with International Trends, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV 1671, 1687 (2014) (“But the ATS as
explicated in Sosa is not a garden-variety jurisdictional statute; rather, it is at once both
jurisdictional and substantive in that it authorizes the creation of federal common law.”).
49
Id.
50
Id. at 720.
51
See id. at 724.
52
See id. at 714; id. at 719 (“The anxieties of the preconstitutional period cannot be
ignored easily enough to think that the statute was not meant to have practical effect.”).
53
Id. at 725.
45
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they “affect the relationship between states or between an individual and
a foreign state . . . .” 54 The courts may look to a variety of sources55 to
determine which violations of the law of nations are sufficiently specific,
universal, and obligatory to satisfy the Sosa requirements for adopting an
ATS cause of action. 56
Sosa itself held that a claim for “arbitrary detention” is too vague to
be actionable.57 In that case, a federal grand jury indicted Alvarez, a
Mexican national, for the torture and murder of a DEA agent in
Mexico. 58 The United States issued a warrant for his arrest, but the
Mexican Government refused to cooperate.59 In response, the DEA
abducted and transported Alvarez to the United States.60 Alvarez brought
suit under the ATS against the DEA for arbitrarily detaining him. 61 The
Court held that arbitrary detention was not a clear and universally
recognized international law violation required for ATS jurisdiction.62
Since then, lower courts have found claims for crimes against humanity,
war crimes, genocide, torture, extrajudicial killings, forced
disappearances of persons, and slavery, 63 to meet Sosa’s test. Other
courts have found claims for detention of a foreign national without
being informed of availability of consular notification and access,64 cross
border parental-child abduction,65 use of poisoned weapons, 66
terrorism67, “the right to life,” 68 and “the right to health,” 69 to not meet
Sosa’s test.
54

Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 770 F.3d 170, 181 (2d Cir. 2014) (“Murder of one private
party by another, universally proscribed by domestic law of all countries . . . is not
actionable under the AT[S] . . . because the nations of the world have not demonstrated
that this wrong is of mutual, and not merely several, concern.”).
55
Sexual Minorities Uganda v. Lively, 960 F. Supp. 2d 304, 316 (D. Mass. 2013)
(finding that treaties, judicial decisions, and controlling legislative content of
international law can be consulted in finding international law violations that furnish ATS
jurisdiction).
56
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732.
57
See id. at 738.
58
Id. at 697.
59
Id. at 697-98.
60
Id. at 698.
61
Id.
62
Id. at 738.
63
Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2014).
64
Mora v. New York, 524 F.3d 183, 208 (2d Cir. 2008).
65
Taveras v. Taveraz, 477 F.3d 767, 781 (6th Cir. 2007).
66
Vietnam Ass’n for Victims of Agent Orange v. Dow Chemical Co., 517 F.3d 104,
119 (2d Cir. 2008).
67
In re Chiquita Brands Intern., Inc. Alien Tort Statute and S’holder Derivative Litig.,
792 F. Supp. 2d 1301, 1321 (S.D. Fla. 2011).
68
Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 343 F.3d 140, 160 (2d Cir. 2003).
69
Id.
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Significantly, the lower courts have found that aiding and abetting
liability satisfy Sosa’s requirement of definiteness and acceptance. 70 The
recognition of aiding and abetting liability under the ATS has been
paramount for human rights plaintiffs looking to hold MNCs liable for
violations of international law. Corporations are often indirect
contributors to alleged ATS violations. 71 In Doe, for example, Nestle
USA was accused of providing assistance to Ivorian famers who used
child slaves. 72 To establish aiding and abetting liability, many federal
circuits require a showing that the defendant provided assistance to the
principal “with the purpose of facilitating the commission of that
crime.” 73 Plaintiffs attempting to hold MNCs liable for their conduct
have often failed on this ground. 74

III.

THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST EXTRATERRITORIALITY

Whenever Congress enacts law, it is presumed that the law only
governs within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.75 Courts
may, however, infer from a federal statute’s text that the law’s coverage
extends beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. 76 This

70
E.g., Khulumani v. Barclay Nat. Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 260 (2d Cir. 2007); Doe
v. Nestle, S.A., 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1078 (C.D. Cal. 2010); Romero v. Drummond Co.,
Inc., 552 F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008); Aziz v. Alcodac, Inc., 658 F.3d 388, 390 (4th
Cir. 2011).
71
See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1662 (2013) (alleged
that Royal Dutch Petroleum enlisted help of Nigerian Government to violently suppress
protesting citizens); Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 59 F. Supp. 3d 75, 83 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
(alleged that Exxon Mobil, who hired Indonesian soldiers to guard a natural gas field,
injured and killed plaintiffs).
72
Doe, 748 F. Supp. at 1064.
73
In re Chiquita Brands Intern., Inc., 792 F. Supp. 2d at 1343 (emphasis added)
(holding that in order to plead aiding and abetting liability, plaintiff must establish that
defendant acted with the purpose or intent to assist in the violation); Aziz, 658 F.3d at 401
(holding that a purposeful mens rea is required for aiding and abetting liability); contra
Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 35 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (holding that mere
knowledge will suffice for the mens rea of an aider and abettor); see Cabello v.
Fernandez-Larios, 402 F.3d 1148, 1161 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that plaintiffs had to
establish a knowledge mens).
74
See, e.g., Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 770 F.3d 170, 192 (2d Cir. 2014) (holding that
there is no support that Chevron intended to aid and abet violations of the Saddam
Hussein regime); see also Aziz, 658 F.3d at 401 (holding that conclusory allegations that
defendant corporation purposefully placed Kromfax into commerce to manufacture
chemical weapons is insufficient to meet the aiding and abetting mens rea requirement).
75
E.E.O.C. v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991).
76
See Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010) (finding that
whether the presumption applies is a question of congressional intent).
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rule of statutory interpretation serves to prevent “unintended clashes
between our laws and those of other nations.” 77
In 1909, the Supreme Court delivered American Banana Co. v.
United Fruit Co., its seminal case on the presumption against
extraterritoriality, before it was known as such. 78 United Fruit Co., a
New Jersey corporate defendant, monopolized banana trade by buying its
competitors’ businesses. 79 American Banana Co., the plaintiff, owned a
banana plantation in Panama. 80 During that time, Panama gave the Costa
Rican government control over the area where plaintiff operated its
banana plantation.81 Plaintiff alleged that United Fruit Co. induced Costa
Rican soldiers to seize plaintiff’s banana plantation, 82 after which,
plaintiff then brought suit in federal court under the Sherman Act to
prevent defendant from participating in the banana market.83 The Court
ultimately declined to find jurisdiction under the Sherman Act because
the conduct at issue took place outside of the United States. 84 It declared
that “in case of doubt [a statute should be] confined in its operation and
effect to the territorial limits over which the lawmaker has general and
legitimate power. All legislation is prima facie territorial.”85 Thus, the
Court ruled that the Sherman Act did not apply extraterritoriality. 86
Throughout the years, courts have applied the presumption against
extraterritoriality to dismiss claims where conduct took place outside of
the United States. In Morrison, 87 plaintiffs brought suit against National
Australia Bank for allegedly committing securities fraud in violation of
section 10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. 88 The Court
never proceeded to the merits of plaintiffs’ securities fraud claim. 89
Rather, it ruled that the presumption against extraterritoriality applied to
section 10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange Act because nothing in the
text of 10b-5 indicated that the statute should have extraterritorial
application. 90 Because the securities in question were traded exclusively

77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90

Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 248.
Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
Id. at 354.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 357.
Id. at 355.
Id. at 357 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
See infra pp. 137-38.
Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 250-51 (2010).
Id. at 273.
Id. at 262.
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on the Australian Stock Exchange, and on other foreign exchanges, the
Court found that the presumption barred plaintiffs’ suit.91
Similarly, the Foley Bros court held that the presumption against
extraterritoriality applied to the Eight Hour Law, 92 which dictated that
workers with longer than eight hour shifts were entitled to a payment of
not less than one-half times the standard pay rate. 93 In Foley Bros,
defendants contracted to construct public works for the United States in
Iraq and Iran. 94 Plaintiffs, who were laborers under the contract, worked
more than eight hour days without overtime compensation. 95
Nonetheless, the Court held that because no language in the Eight Hour
Law suggested that Congress intended for the law to apply
extraterritorially, the Court could not hear a claim for violations that took
place in Iraq and Iran. 96

A.
ATS

Applying the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality to the

The presumption against extraterritoriality is intended to prevent
“unintended clashes between our laws and those of other nations.” 97
Indeed, the legislative and executive branches are thought to be better
equipped to handle sensitive questions of international law.98 These
concerns are of particular importance in regards to the ATS, under which
courts can craft private causes of actions based on international law
violations that carry unknown foreign policy consequences.99 When
conduct occurs in the territory of a foreign sovereign, as it often does
under the ATS, foreign policy concerns are magnified.100 However, ATS
claims that reach a foreign territory do not always implicate the same
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Id. at 273.
See Foley Bros v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949).
93
Id. at 283.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Id. at 285.
97
E.E.O.C. v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991).
98
John H. Knox, A Presumption Against Extrajurisdictionality, 104 AM. J. INT’L L.
351, 386 (2010).
99
See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 728 (2004).
100
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1665 (2013); Amicus US 6
(“Modern litigation under the ATS has focused primarily on alleged law of nation
violations committed within foreign countries.”).
92
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presumption. 101 For example, many cases will involve sovereigns that are
either silently or openly in favor of the litigation.102
While the recognition of certain international law violations may
create foreign policy consequences, failing to address those international
law violations can create similar consequences.103 That is particularly so
when the international law violations are committed by United States
citizens. In such cases, the application of the presumption can create the
very international consequences the presumption seeks to avoid. 104 If the
United States makes its courts unavailable for claims against its citizens,
for actions taken within a foreign country, the United States may be
sending the other nations a message of its acquiescence in the alleged
violations. 105
In Kiobel, the Court held that the presumption against
extraterritoriality applies to the ATS because Congress gave no
indication that it intended for the statute to have extraterritorial reach. 106
Justice Breyer, on the other hand, felt the presumption should not apply
to the ATS. 107 He explained that “the ATS . . . was enacted with ‘foreign
matters’ in mind.” 108 In support of his position, Breyer noted the statute’s
reference to “‘alien[s],’ ‘treat[ies],’ and ‘the law of nations,’”109 and
further argued that he ATS’ purpose is to remedy violations of the law of
nations that could otherwise lead to international consequences. 110
The ATS concerns international law. The United States is formally
committed to the application of international law, while recognizing that
human rights violations are not purely domestic concerns of any

101

Stephens, supra note 30, at 1540.
Id.; see, e.g., In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467,
1472 (9th Cir. 1994) (“This is evidenced by the Philippine government’s agreement that
that the suit against Marcos proceed.”).
103
See Sexual Minorities Uganda v. Lively, 960 F. Supp. 2d 304, 323 (D. Mass. 2013)
(“Under the law of nations, states are obliged to make civil courts of justice accessible for
claims of foreign subjects against individuals within that state’s territory. ‘If the court’s
decision constitutes a denial of justice, or if it appears to condone the original wrongful
act, under the law of nations the United States would become responsible’”) (citing TelOren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 783 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J.,
concurring)); see also Anthony J. Colangelo, A United Approach to Extraterritoriality, 97
VA. L. REV. 1019, 1024 (2011) (“[T]he presumption . . . may achieve precisely what it
was designed to avoid: discord with foreign nations.”).
104
Id.
105
Id.
106
Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.
107
Id. at 1671 (Breyer, J., concurring).
108
Id. at 1672.
109
Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012)).
110
Id.
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sovereign state. 111 One aspect of international human rights law is the
concept of universal jurisdiction. 112 The Restatement of Foreign
Relations Law provides that a State should have jurisdiction to punish
certain international law violations even if the State lacks any territorial
connection to the alleged offense or has any nationality links with the
offender. 113 Piracy, genocide, and war crimes are a few offenses that fall
under this definition. 114 Even though these violations are also actionable
under the ATS, Kiobel ruled that the presumption against
extraterritoriality applies to the statute.115 As a result, the ATS does not
grant jurisdiction on claims that are otherwise actionable under the
principle of universal jurisdiction.

IV.

THE KIOBEL TEST AND A CRITIQUE OF ITS APPLICATION IN
THE LOWER COURTS

In 2013, the Supreme Court in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.
decided that the presumption against extraterritoriality applies to ATS
claims. 116 Kiobel involved Nigerian nationals, residing in the United
States, who filed suit against Dutch, British, and Nigerian
corporations. 117 The plaintiffs alleged that the corporations aided and
abetted the Nigerian Government in committing violations of the law of
nations in Nigeria. 118 Specifically, plaintiffs accused Royal Dutch
Petroleum of enlisting the Nigerian Government to “violently suppress”
citizens who protested the environmental effects of Royal Dutch
Petroleum’s oil exploration in Nigeria.119 Chief Justice Roberts, writing
for the majority, held, on the facts of the case, that “all the relevant
conduct took place outside the United States.” 120 He further declared
that, “even where the claims touch and concern the territory of the
United States, they must do so with sufficient force to displace the
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See U.S DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Human Rights, (Nov. 11 2015),
www.state.gov/j/drl/hr (“The United States seeks to [h]old governments accountable to
their obligations under universal international human rights norms and international
human rights instruments.”).
112
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION TO
DEFINE AND PUNISH CERTAIN OFFENSES § 404 (1987).
113
Id.
114
Id.
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Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013).
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Id.
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Id. at 1662.
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Id.
119
Id.
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Id. at 1669.
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presumption against extraterritorial application.”121 Roberts added that
“[c]orporations are often present in many countries, and it would reach
too far to say that mere corporate presence suffices.”122
Kiobel sets forth two inquiries to determine whether the presumption
against extraterritoriality bars an ATS claim: (1) does all of the relevant
conduct take place outside of the United States? 123 and (2) does the
claim touch and concern the territory of the United States with sufficient
force to displace the presumption against extraterritoriality? 124 These
inquiries do not provide lower courts with an adequate framework for
resolving complicated fact scenarios that often arise under the ATS.125
Consider the following hypotheticals. In each fact pattern, a coal
mining company (“mining company”) hires a criminal organization
(“organization”) to torture a coal mining labor union member (“union
member”). The union member thereafter brings an ATS action against
the company. The first hypothetical will show difficulties in applying the
first part of the Kiobel inquiry. The second hypothetical will show
difficulties in applying the second.
In the first hypothetical, the mining company, the organization, and
the union member are from Colombia. The Colombian mining company
hires the Colombian organization in the United States, where they plan
the torture. The Colombian organization then commits the torture in
Colombia.
Under the first hypothetical, some conduct takes places in the United
States, while some conduct takes place abroad. The defendant hires the
torturer in the United States, plans the torture in the United States, but
executes the torture in Colombia. Under the first Kiobel inquiry, would
hiring a torturer and planning with a torturer constitute “relevant
conduct”? Assuming it does, the criminal organization still executed the
torture outside of the United States. Is it enough that some of the
“relevant conduct” takes place inside the United States, while the main
conduct takes place abroad? How much relevant conduct needs to take
place in the United States for ATS jurisdiction?
In the second hypothetical, the mining company and the organization
are from the United States, while the union member is from Colombia.
The United States mining company hires the United States organization
121

Id.
Id.
123
Id.
124
Id.
125
Roger P. Alford, The Future of Human Rights Litigation After Kiobel, 89 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1749, 1754 (2014) (“The Kiobel decision is complex and confusing,
offering scant guidance as to how lower courts should proceed when claims touch and
concern U.S. territory.”).
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in Colombia, where they plan the torture. The United States organization
then tortures the Colombian union member in Colombia.
In the second hypothetical, all of the relevant conduct, including the
hiring, the planning, and the torture takes place abroad, putting an end to
the first inquiry. The defendant is a United States company that hired a
United States criminal organization to torture a Colombian citizen. Does
the fact that the defendant is a United States company, coupled with the
fact that it hired a criminal organization from the United States, touch
and concern the territory of the United States with sufficient force? What
if the criminal organization was from Colombia and only the defendant
was from the United States? Would that claim sufficiently touch and
concern the United States? What if the union member was part of a
United States labor union? Would that be enough force to displace the
presumption?
Many of these questions regarding the operation of the two Kiobel
inquiries are questions that the lower courts have attempted to answer.
The following section will illustrate how the lower courts have dealt with
some of these ambiguities.
There are a several types of United States contacts that can
potentially render a claim domestic, and not extraterritorial, for purposes
of the presumption against territoriality. These include: (1) the execution
of a violation in the United States; (2) the planning of a violation in the
United States; (3) the effects of a violation in the United States; and (4)
the United States citizenship of a party to the violation. On one end, if
the execution of a violation takes place in the United States, the claim is
clearly domestic and the presumption will be no obstacle to jurisdiction.
On the other hand, if the execution of the violation takes place outside of
the United States, but a party to the claim is a United States citizen, or
the effects of the claim are felt in the United States, the claim may be
considered extraterritorial and barred under the presumption. Similarly, if
the execution of a federal law violation occurs outside of the United
States, but the planning of the execution of the violation takes place in
the United States, it is unclear whether the claim is domestic or
extraterritorial for the purposes of the presumption.
The Kiobel test looks to the location of “relevant conduct” to
determine whether a claim is extraterritorial. This forecloses the
possibility of finding a claim to be domestic when there exists simply
United States effects or a United States citizen is a party to the claim,
without there being United States conduct. Thus, under Kiobel a claim is
only extraterritorial if it contains effects in the United States or if a
United States citizen is involved. At this point, the presumption may only
be overcome if the claim touches and concerns the United States territory
with sufficient force.
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Relationship Between the Two Kiobel Clauses
1. When to Proceed

Lower court decisions disagree as to when courts should proceed to
the second Kiobel inquiry. The Second Circuit held that if none of the
relevant conduct takes place within the United States, the court need not
proceed to the second inquiry; the presumption against extraterritoriality,
which is not easily overcome, bars plaintiff’s ATS claim. 126 By this
account, the only time the second inquiry would be triggered is if it is not
the case that all the relevant conduct took place abroad. Only in such an
instance would the second question be triggered, in which the courts
would employ a “fact-based” inquiry to see if the claims “touch and
concern” the United States with “sufficient force” to displace the
presumption. 127
The Fourth Circuit, on the other hand, determined that the two
inquiries are always relevant.128 It held that even if all the relevant
conduct takes place abroad, the court should still consider the inquiry
contemplated in the second part of the Kiobel test. 129 Thus, even if all
relevant conduct took place abroad, the court needs to ask whether the
“claims” of the plaintiff, “including the parties’ identities and their
relationship to the causes of action,” touch and concern the United States
with enough force to displace the presumption against
extraterritoriality. 130
There is reason to view the Fourth Circuit’s approach as the better
one. If the Second Circuit’s approach were correct, there would have
been no need for the Supreme Court to articulate part two of its test,
based on the facts of Kiobel. In Kiobel, the Court said all the relevant
conduct occurred abroad. If that were the end of the matter, it would be
dictum for the Kiobel Court to have articulated circumstances under the
second inquiry that would displace the presumption. 131 Admittedly, the
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Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174, 189 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that Kiobel bars
the plaintiffs’ claims because the plaintiffs did not allege “any relevant conduct that
occurred within the United States.”).
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See Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 528 (4th Cir. 2014).
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See id.
129
Id. at 528 (“However, the clear implication of the Court’s ‘touch and concern’
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Id. at 527.
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See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013).
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Courts do occasionally give guidance to lower courts beyond the facts of
the case. 132
The disagreement, between the Second and the Fourth Circuits, is
important for corporate liability. If the Second Circuit approach is
correct, then ATS actions for human rights violations that take place
abroad will be barred even if the defendant is an American multinational,
so long as all the “relevant conduct” (whatever that may be) took place
abroad. If the Fourth Circuit is correct, on the other hand, there might be
room for arguing that the claims touch and concern the territory of the
United States on account of the defendant corporation’s United States
nationality.

2. Conflation of the Clauses
The Second Circuit partially conflated parts one and two of the
Kiobel test. 133 In Mastafa, the Second Circuit declared that in deciding
whether the presumption against extraterritoriality bars a plaintiff’s
claim, “the first step is to determine whether the ‘relevant’ conduct . . .
sufficiently ‘touches and concerns’ the territory of the United
States . . . .” 134 In Al Shimari, the Fourth Circuit identically declared that
“the presumption against extraterritorial application bars the exercise of
subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ ATS claims unless the
‘relevant conduct’ . . . ‘touch[es] and concern[s]’ the territory of the
United States with sufficient force . . . .” 135
Part two of the Kiobel test asks whether the “claims”—not the
“relevant conduct”—touch and concern the United States. 136 In Al
Shimari, the Fourth Circuit explained this distinction: “We also note that
the Court broadly stated that the ‘claims,’ rather than the ‘alleged tortious
conduct,’ must touch and concern United States territory with sufficient
force.” 137 The court then defined “claim” as the “aggregate of operative
132

See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (finding that the
mentally ill and felons are still forbidden from using guns, even though the mentally ill or
felons were not involved in the case).
133
Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 770 F.3d 170, 186 (2d Cir. 2014) (holding that the first
step is to determine whether the relevant conduct sufficiently touches and concerns the
territory of the United States); Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at 527 (holding that “relevant
conduct” frames the touch and concern inquiry).
134
Mastafa, 770 F.3d at 186.
135
Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at 528.
136
Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669; Mujica v. AirScan Inc., 771 F.3d 580, 618 (9th Cir.
2014) (Zilly, J., concurring) (“In concluding that . . . plaintiffs must allege some
‘conduct’ within our borders, the majority misconstrues Kiobel’s ‘touch and concern’
test, which is focused on the connection between the ATS ‘claims’ and the United
States.”).
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Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at 527.

2015]

ALIEN TORT STATUTE

129

facts giving rise to a right enforceable by a court,” 138 and added that
“claim” should include the parties’ identities and their relationship to the
causes of action. 139 By this reading, circumstances that can displace the
presumption against extraterritoriality are broader than the defendant’s
“relevant conduct.” 140 While “relevant conduct” is certainly one
component of a plaintiff’s “claim,” (the aggregate of operative facts
giving rise to an enforceable right) to be considered under the second
inquiry, so is the defendant’s status as a United States corporation, which
does not fit into the narrower category of the defendant’s “conduct.”141
The plain language of Kiobel corresponds with the Fourth Circuit’s
approach that it is the “claims” that should touch and concern the United
States, not just the “relevant conduct.” 142 Properly understood, Justice
Breyer’s concurrence offers factors that can make up those “claims.” 143
Breyer would find jurisdiction over an ATS claim where: (1) the alleged
tort occurred on American Soil, (2) the defendant is an American
national, or (3) the defendant’s conduct substantially and adversely
affects an important American national interest.144 Under Breyer’s test,
the fact that the defendant is an American national, or that the
defendant’s conduct substantially and adversely affects an important
American interest, can make up the components of a claim that “touch
and concern the United States [ ]with sufficient force . . . .” 145

B.

Kiobel Part One: “Relevant Conduct”
1. Restrictive Reading of “Relevant Conduct”

Under the first Kiobel inquiry, if a claim involves conduct that
occurs both domestically and abroad, the “relevant” conduct must occur
in the United States.146 Otherwise, a plaintiff will be required to show,
under part two, that the claim touches and concerns the United States
with enough force in order to overcome the presumption. 147
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Id. (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 281 (9th ed. 2009)).
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See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013).
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The lower courts have narrowly interpreted “relevant conduct” from
the first Kiobel inquiry. 148 Cardona, an Eleventh Circuit case, is
illustrative of the lower courts’ narrow interpretation. 149 In that case,
four-thousand Colombians brought suit against Chiquita, Inc., a United
States corporation, for violating the ATS. 150 They alleged that Chiquita
participated “in a campaign of torture and murder in Colombia by
reviewing, approving, and concealing a scheme of payments and
weapons shipments to Colombian terrorist organizations, all from their
corporate offices in [New Jersey].” 151 The plaintiffs’ claimed that
terrorists used these weapons to commit war crimes.152 Upon review, the
Eleventh Circuit decided that the presumption against extraterritorially
defeated jurisdiction because all the tortious conduct took place outside
of the United States.153
The court’s holding reflects its position that under part one of Kiobel,
relevant conduct is conduct that constitutes a violation of the law of
nations under Sosa. 154 While the scope of “relevant conduct” under part
one is unclear, it seems that if the Kiobel majority wanted only the
location of defendant’s international law violation to determine whether
the presumption against extraterritoriality barred a claim, it would have
avoided using a term as general as “relevant conduct,” which seems to
encompass more. 155
The Cardona court ultimately found that approving weapon
shipments to terrorist organizations did not qualify as a violation of the
law of nations under Sosa. 156 As a result, plaintiffs’ claims were subject
to part two of the Kiobel test. 157 Under part two, the court, like the
148

See Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174, 193 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that the
presumption bars claims where subsidiary companies facilitate an apartheid regime from
U.S.); see also Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 530 (4th Cir.
2014) (holding that the presumption bars claims where a subsidiary of a Delaware
corporation hire interrogators that participate in conduct that violates Geneva
convention).
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Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 760 F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2014).
150
Id. at 1188.
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Id. at 1192 (Martin, J., dissenting).
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Id. at 1194 (Martin, J., dissenting).
153
Id. at 1189 (noting that any tort in the case was committed outside of the United
States).
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See id. The Second and Ninth Circuits have similarly limited relevant conduct to
tortious conduct. See Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174, 182 (holding that the
presumption bars the claim because all of the violations of international law occurred
abroad); see also Doe I v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 69 F. Supp. 3d 75, 96 (D.C. 2014)
(holding that ATS claims can go forward if some actionable conduct occurred in the
United States).
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See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013).
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157
Id.
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Second circuit, misconstrued the Kiobel inquiry and decided that “[no]
act constituting a tort in terms of the ATS touched and concerned the
territory of the United States with any force.” 158

2. Overactive Presumption Against Extraterritoriality
As a result of the lower courts’ restrictive interpretation of “relevant
conduct,” plaintiffs must establish that the defendant committed an
international law violation on American soil.159 This creates a high
barrier to ATS jurisdiction.
To illustrate this point, imagine that Royal Dutch Petroleum
provided financial assistance from the United States to an oppressive
South African governmental regime that tortured and killed its citizens in
exchange for access to South African petroleum reservoirs. In many
jurisdictions, in order to prove that Royal Dutch Petroleum aided and
abetted the regime (committed an international law violation), plaintiffs
would have to show that Royal Dutch Petroleum provided financial
assistance with the purpose of furthering the regime. If Royal Dutch
Petroleum provided financial assistance only to gain access to petroleum,
the corporation did not act with the purpose of furthering the regime, and
did not aid and abet the government. And if plaintiffs were in a
jurisdiction that proceeded to the second inquiry, they would have to
plead that their claim touches and concerns the territory of the United
States. If not, their claim would be barred by the presumption against
extraterritoriality.
The jurisdictional threshold is lower in other statutory contexts. For
section 10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, if an investor
purchases or sells securities on a United States stock exchange, the
presumption against extraterritoriality would not bar the investor’s claim,
even where other conduct required for establishing the 10b-5 violations
occurs abroad. 160 Although, the plaintiff does need to show that the entire
violation occurred within the United States, as is the case within the
context of the ATS. 161 For example, a company could defraud investors
158

Id. It is the “claims” that should touch and concern the territory of the United States,
which is broader than requiring a tort to touch and concern. See Mujica v. AirScan Inc.,
771 F.3d 580, 618 (9th Cir. 2014) (Zilly, J., concurring).
159
See, e.g., Doe I, 69 F. Supp. 3d at 96 (holding that an ATS claim can go forward if
some actionable conduct occurred in the United States).
160
See Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 270-71 (2010). Under
Morrison, as long as the purchase or sale of the security occurs in the United States, the
Court has jurisdiction to hear the claim. Id. This is so even if the fraudulent conduct in
connection with the purchase or sale of the security, such as releasing misleading
statements, occurs outside of the United States. See id.
161
See id. at 267-68.
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by reporting misleading figures about a company’s financial health in
Australia. As long as the securities were purchased or sold on an
American stock exchange, the presumption against extraterritoriality
would not bar a plaintiff’s suit under section 10b-5 of the Securities and
Exchange Act.
Similarly, the Court in Continental Ore Co. did not require plaintiffs
to plead that a violation of the anti-trust laws occurred within the United
States to attain jurisdiction. 162 In Continental Ore Co., defendant
corporations were accused of monopolizing the trade of vanadium
products by selling them in Canada.163 Despite the foreign location of
defendant’s conduct, the Court had jurisdiction to hear the claim. 164 The
Court reasoned that the presumption against extraterritoriality did not
apply because the sale of Vanadium products in Canada impacted trade
within the United States. 165 Plaintiffs did not have to allege that every
element, required to constitute violation of the law, occurred in the
United States, as they do under the ATS. 166
The presumption against extraterritoriality is less aggressive in
connection with 10b-5 and the antitrust laws. However, for a plaintiff to
avoid triggering the presumption against extraterritoriality under the
ATS, he must establish that the defendant, on American soil, violated
international law—not merely an element of that law.

C.
Kiobel Part Two: Displacing the Presumption Against
Extraterritoriality
1. Meaning of “Touch and Concern the Territory of the
United States”
The second Kiobel inquiry uses language that has proven to be
ineffective within the context of covenants and servitudes. “Touch and
concern” originates from an old English decision concerning the law of
covenants called Spencer’s Case.167 Spencer’s Case held that for
covenants to survive the transfer of land, they must “touch and concern”
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See Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide and Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 704
(1962) (“A conspiracy to monopolize or restrain the domestic or foreign commerce of the
United States is not outside the reach of the Sherman Act just because part of the conduct
complained of occurs in foreign countries.”).
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Id. at 692-93.
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See id. at 704.
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Spencer’s Case, 5 Co. Rep. 16a, 77 Eng. Rep. 72 (K.B. 1583).
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the land they run with. 168 For hundreds of years, courts and
commentators have struggled defining the meaning of “touch and
concern.” 169 One court declared, “in truth, such a description or test . . . is
too vague to be of much assistance.” 170 In 1988, the American Law
Institute removed the “touch and concern” language in the Restatement
(Third) of Property: Servitudes. 171
It is difficult to decipher what “touch and concern” means in relation
to United States territory under Kiobel. On a basic level, touch means “to
relate to” or “to have an influence on,” 172 and concern similarly means
“to relate to” or “to affect or involve.”173
Whether a claim touches and concerns the territory of the United
States could turn on how a court defines “touch” and “concern.” 174 To
illustrate this point, imagine that certain Nigerian plaintiffs brought an
ATS action against a Nigerian corporation for using Nigerian slaves.
Imagine also that the slaves worked in a factory in Nigeria. It can be said
that this ATS claim relates to the United States, because the Nigerian
corporation engages in a practice that the United States is committed to
ending. But because the suit involves foreigners working in foreign
factories, the suit does not involve the United States. If this hypothetical
court interpreted “touch and concern” to mean “involve,” the plaintiffs
could not bring their ATS claim.
It is also unclear what the Kiobel Court meant by “the territory of the
United States.” 175 Literally, territory of the United States could mean its
physical territory. By this interpretation, plaintiffs’ claims must touch
and concern something that exists within the physical boundaries of the
United States. For example, if ExxonMobil violated international law
when it procured oil in Iran, and that oil was shipped into the physical
territory of the United States, the claim “touched” the territory of the
United States. Alternatively, touching and concerning United States
territory could mean touching and concerning important interests of the
United States. This approach would mirror the second prong of Justice
Breyer’s concurrence in Kiobel, in which he would find ATS jurisdiction
where “the defendant’s conduct substantially and adversely affects an
168
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256 (N.Y. 1938).
170
Id.
171
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important American national interest.”176 Under this interests approach to
interpreting the United States territory, even if ExxonMobil never
transported oil into the physical territory of the United States, it could
still touch and concern American interests if the lawful procurement of
oil is sufficiently important to the United States. Because the Kiobel
majority did not adopt Breyer’s test, it is unlikely, however, that they
would find the presumption displaced when claims merely touch and
concern American interests. 177
A court’s interpretation of “touch and concern” and “territory of the
United States” does not guarantee a particular result in any case.
Ultimately, an ATS claim must “touch and concern” with “sufficient
force.” 178 Even if a court uses the broader “relate to” definition of “touch
and concern,” which could seemingly be satisfied by any set of facts, the
Kiobel test allows the court to determine to what extent such claims
would need to “relate to” the territory of the United States with the
“sufficient force” requirement. The only guidance given by the Court as
to how much “force” is required to displace the presumption is that the
facts of Kiobel were insufficient. 179 Beyond that, courts are free to
decide.

2. Corporate Citizenship Insufficient to Displace the
Presumption Against Extraterritoriality
Kiobel offered the lower courts little guidance in determining, under
part two of its test, what circumstances would have enough force to
displace the presumption against extraterritoriality. 180 If, for example,
ExxonMobil were to aid and abet war crimes in Ecuador, it is unclear
what circumstances would allow a United States court to hear ATS
claims against ExxonMobil.
The lower courts disagree about whether a defendant’s status as a
United States corporation can displace the presumption when the claim
involves conduct that occurred on foreign territory. The Ninth and
Eleventh Circuits held that a defendant’s status as a United States
corporation alone is insufficient to allow jurisdiction in such
situations, 181 whereas the Fourth Circuit held that a corporation’s United
176

See id. at 1671 (Breyer, J., concurring).
See id. at 1669.
178
Id.
179
Id.
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Id.
181
See Mujica v. AirScan Inc., 771 F.3d 580, 594 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he Supreme
Court has never suggested that a plaintiff can bring an action based solely on
extraterritorial conduct merely because the defendant is a U.S. national.”); see Cardona v.
Chiquita Brands Int’l Inc., 760 F.3d 1185, 1189 (11th Cir. 2014) (extending the Kiobel
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States citizenship is one factor that weighs in favor of jurisdiction.182 The
Fourth Circuit did not clarify whether United States citizenship was
alone sufficient to displace the presumption. 183 The Second Circuit has
taken the position that a defendant’s status as a United States corporation
is irrelevant under Kiobel and has no force in displacing the presumption
when the “relevant conduct” takes place outside of the United States.184
Under the Second Circuit’s ruling, then, the fact that ExxonMobil is a
United States corporation would not help victims of the war crimes,
committed in Ecuador, bring an ATS action.
This decision to render insignificant a defendant-corporation’s status
as a United States corporation is flawed. The Second Circuit argued that
because Kiobel ruled that “mere corporate presence” was insufficient to
overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality, United States
corporate citizenship too must be insufficient. 185 But Kiobel, in finding
that “mere corporate presence” was insufficient, seemingly addressed the
facts of Kiobel, where the defendants were Nigerian and Dutch
corporations. 186 The Court did not rule on the question of United States
corporate citizenship, because the Kiobel defendants were not United
States corporations. 187 Indeed, the Supreme Court’s holding was
intentionally incomplete.188 The status of United States corporations
involve a stronger connection to the United States than a foreign
corporation having presence in the United States. To treat citizenship and
presence the same ignores this fact.
The Second Circuit further justified its marginalization of United
States corporate citizenship by citing Aramco. 189 In that case, a United
States citizen claimed that his United States corporate employer, Arabian
principle that corporate presence is not enough to displace the presumption that corporate
citizenship is not enough).
182
See Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 530 (4th Cir. 2014)
(holding that the claims touched and concerned the United States with sufficient force, in
part, because the defendant was a United States corporation).
183
Id.
184
See Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 770 F.3d 170, 195 (2d Cir. 2014) (holding that the
precedent establishes that the defendant’s U.S. citizenship does not affect jurisdictional
analysis).
185
See id. at 188.
186
See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1660 (2013).
187
See id.
188
See id. at 1669 (Alito, J., concurring) (“This formulation obviously leaves much
unanswered.”); see also Mujica, v. AirScan, Inc., 771 F.3d 580, 594 (9th Cir. 2014)
(“Admittedly, Kiobel (quite purposely) did not enumerate the specific kinds of
connections to the United States that could establish that ATS claims ‘touch and concern’
this country.”).
189
Mastafa, 770 F.3d at 188 (citing E.E.O.C. v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244,
247 (1991)).
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American Oil Company, violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. 190
The plaintiff alleged that Arabian American Oil Company’s subsidiary
transferred plaintiff from Houston to Saudi Arabia, where he was
discriminated against on account of his race, religion, and national
origin. 191 Despite the fact that Arabian American Oil Company was a
United States corporation, Aramco held that the presumption against
extraterritoriality barred plaintiff’s claim, which involved discrimination
in Saudi Arabia. 192
Even though a defendant’s United States nationality does not rebut
the presumption against extraterritoriality within the context of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act, it does not mean that a defendant’s United States
nationality will not, within the context of the ATS. 193 In connection with
the ATS, a defendant’s United States citizenship is of particular
concern—“the sovereign who refuses to cause a reparation to be made
for the damages caused by his subject, or to punish the offender, or
finally, to deliver him up, renders himself in some measure an
accomplice in the injury, and becomes responsible for it.”194
Furthermore, “[i]n focusing on the ATS ‘claims,’ and not the underlying
‘conduct,’ the Kiobel Court carefully left open the door through which
foreign victims of heinous acts by United States nationals could hold
such individuals or corporate entities accountable.”195

D.
Irreconcilable Application of the Presumption Against
Extraterritoriality
If a claim involves conduct that occurred on foreign territory, courts
may still exercise jurisdiction if the claim has a sufficiently strong
connection to the United States. 196 The stronger the domestic contacts of
a claim, the less likely it is that the claim should be excluded by the

190

Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 247.
Id.
192
Id. at 259.
193
See Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 266 (2010) (holding that
the presumption against extraterritoriality will act differently depending on the focus of
the statute at issue).
194
Brief for Professors of International Law, Foreign Relations Law and Federal
Jurisdiction as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10-1491), 2012 WL 379581, at *8-9 (quoting
Emmerich de Vattel, who is thought to be the “Founders’ leading authority on the law of
nations”).
195
Mujica v. AirScan Inc., 771 F.3d 580, 619 (9th Cir. 2014) (Zilly, J., concurring).
196
See Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 770 F.3d 170, 182 (2d Cir. 2014) (“An evaluation of
the presumption’s application to a particular case is essentially an inquiry into whether
the domestic contacts are sufficient to avoid triggering the presumption at all.”).
191
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presumption. 197 A comparison of Mastafa and Sexual Minorities Uganda
demonstrates how the Kiobel test has not always produced such
congruent applications of the presumption against extraterritoriality.
In Mastafa, plaintiffs claimed that Chevron, a United States
corporation, aided and abetted the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq. 198
Plaintiffs were Iraqi women who were tortured by agents of the
regime. 199 They alleged that Chevron aided and abetted the regime by
purchasing oil in the United States from Iraq, and that funding from the
purchase financed the human rights abuses. 200 Employing a “purpose”
aiding and abetting standard, 201 the court found that Chevron did not
purchase oil with the purpose of aiding the Saddam Hussein regime. 202
Accordingly, it found that no international law violation occurred in the
United States, and that the claim was subject to, and barred by, the
presumption against extraterritoriality. 203
In Sexual Minorities Uganda, an American citizen allegedly assisted
and encouraged the denial of fundamental rights to the lesbian, gay,
bisexual, transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) people in Uganda from the
United States. 204 As in Mastafa, the Sexual Minorities Uganda court
employed a purpose aiding and abetting liability standard. Because the
plaintiff, Sexual Minorities Uganda, an LGBTI organization, pleaded
that the American citizen acted with the purpose of aiding and abetting
the persecution of sexual minorities, plaintiff’s suit was not subject to the
presumption against extraterritoriality, and the court could hear the
merits. 205
Circumstances that establish an international law violation in one set
of facts and not in another do not necessarily reflect an increase in
contacts with the United States. 206 A comparison of the United States’
conduct in Mastafa and Sexual Minorities Uganda illustrate this point. In
Mastafa, plaintiffs’ alleged that “Chevron financed the sale of two
million barrels of oil . . . for which Chevron ‘facilitated’ ‘a surcharge
payment of nearly half a million dollars be paid to the [Saddam Hussein]

197

See id.
Id. at 175.
199
Id. at 174-75.
200
Id. at 175.
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Id. at 192.
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Id.
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See id. at 185.
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Sexual Minorities Uganda v. Lively, 960 F. Supp. 2d 304, 312 (D. Mass. 2013).
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Id. at 324.
206
See id. at 322 (“The Supreme Court has made clear that the presumption against
extraterritorial application of a statute comes into play only where a defendant’s conduct
lacks sufficient connection to the United States.”); see Mastafa, 770 F.3d at 182.
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regime.” 207 In Sexual Minorities Uganda, one citizen assisted an
organization by formulating strategies to discriminate and persecute
LBGTI communities. 208 The magnitude of Chevron’s transaction, from
which profits were recouped in the United States, necessarily involved
more contacts with the United States than the citizen’s assistance to
persecute LBGTI communities. Chevron is a large United States
corporation and many of the decisions with regard to the transaction
must have been made “by [its] top stake holders.” 209 Other Chevron
employees, who were not themselves responsible for the decision,
participated in facilitating the transaction. 210 This amount of people, in
combination with the size of the transaction that lead to the regime
payments, involved more of a connection with the United States than in
Sexual Minorities Uganda—where one man assisted an organization to
persecute sexual minorities. Yet, the latter meets the criteria for a
violation of the laws of nations by meeting the elements of aiding and
abetting liability, while Chevron’s transaction does not. The result is that
a transaction with enormous domestic contacts is barred by the
presumption against extraterritoriality, and the other, which in
comparison involves almost none, is not. 211

V.
A.

RETHINKING KIOBEL

The Morrison “Focus” Test

In Morrison, Justice Scalia emphasized that the presumption against
extraterritoriality changes based on the context of its application.212
Morrison dealt with Australian investors who alleged that National
Australia Bank committed securities fraud. 213 According to the
complaint, National Australia Bank’s mortgage servicing company,
Homeslide Lending, manipulated certain financial models in Florida to
make its shares appear more valuable. 214 Thereafter, Australian investors
purchased National Australia Bank’s fraudulently inflated shares on the
Australian Stock exchange. 215

207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215

Id. at 190.
Sexual Minorities Uganda, 960 F. Supp. 2d at 312.
Mastafa, 770 F.3d at 182.
See id.
See id. at 185; see Sexual Minorities Uganda, 960 F. Supp. 2d at 324.
See Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 266 (2010).
Id. at 251.
Id. at 252.
Id.
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Plaintiffs argued that because Florida was where the defendant
manipulated its financial models, the defendant’s conduct was not
“extraterritorial,” and the presumption against extraterritoriality did not
deny the application of 10(b) to their claim. 216 The Supreme Court,
however, declared that the location of purchases and sales of securities—
not the location where the deception originated—governed the
application of the presumption to plaintiffs’ 10(b) claims. 217 In coming to
its decision, the court cited Aramco. 218 In Aramco, the Court concluded
that it was the location of employment, which was the focus of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, that determined whether plaintiffs could
bring their claim. 219
The Morrison court, in quoting Aramco, adopted a “focus” test,
which looks to the “objects of the statute’s solicitude” to determine what
kind of United States contacts can allow a claim to proceed despite the
fact that some conduct took place on foreign soil. 220 Justice Scalia,
applying the test, determined that the focus of section 10(b) is to punish
deceptive conduct only “in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange.” 221 Because the
actual security transaction in Morrison took place outside of the United
States, Scalia ruled that the presumption barred plaintiffs’ claim. 222

B.

Morrison Meets Kiobel

It is unclear whether Kiobel adopted Morrison’s “focus” test. In Doe,
a Ninth Circuit ATS case, the majority and concurrence disagreed on this
matter. 223 The majority decided that Kiobel’s “touch and concern”
language replaced “focus” within the context of the ATS.224 However,
“touch and concern” is not mutually exclusive with “focus.” “Touch and
concern” addresses whether “claims” can displace the presumption
against extraterritoriality. 225 “Focus” determines what types of United
States contacts are necessary to displace the presumption. 226 The “focus”
216

Id. at 266.
Id. at 268.
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Id. at 266.
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See id. at 267.
221
Id. at 266; contra id. at 284 (Stevens, J. dissenting) (claiming that it was the public
interest in investor safety that was the actual object of the statute’s solicitude).
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Id. at 273.
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See Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1028 (9th Cir. 2014) (finding that
Kiobel did not incorporate Morrison’s focus test); but see id. at 1035 (Rawlinson, J.,
concurring) (finding that Kiobel did incorporate Morrison’s focus test).
224
Id. at 1028.
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See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013).
226
See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 267.
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test is narrower in that it looks to a specific type of contact.227 “Touch
and concern” looks to an entire claim. 228 Morrison can be read as
providing substance to the Kiobel test. By this interpretation, the factors
that “touch and concern the United States” with sufficient force are those
that reflect the “focus” of the federal law at issue. 229
Kiobel can be seen as incorporating Morrison’s focus test. Under
Morrison, a federal statute’s “focus” should determine the types of
United States contacts that are necessary for a claim to proceed when the
claim involves conduct that took place on foreign soil.230 After Sosa,
aside from the violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of
ambassadors and piracy, only “judge-inferred” causes of action can
provide plaintiffs the basis for an ATS claim. 231 These causes of action,
according to Justice Alito, are the ATS’s “focus.” 232 Because the Kiobel
test, as interpreted by some of the lower courts, looks to whether these
causes of action (the torts), took place in the United States, Kiobel may
have silently incorporated a Morrison focus standard.
However, the ATS can also be seen as having a different focus. The
focus of the ATS might be those motivating factors that encouraged
Congress to enact the ATS in the first place. 233 This reading would look
to a number of possible motivations for the ATS’s enactment, including:
(1) complying with the law of nations to prevent international conflict, 234
and (2) complying with the law of nations to become a fully functioning
member of the international community. 235
The ATS’s focus can also be the focus of individual international law
violations. Justice Alito declared that the ATS’s focus is international
law causes of action.236 Instead of treating these violations as the
“focus,” the courts could look to the focus of each individual violation to
determine what United States contacts are required for jurisdiction. In
other words, courts would analyze the “focus of the focus.” For example,
treating a 10b-5 violation as the “focus” is different than treating the
purchase and sale of securities, the focus of 10b-5, as the focus.
227

See id.
See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.
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Morrison and subsequent case law offer support to this position, because
those cases analyze particular statutory schemes. 237 When the focus of a
statute is another statute, it could be said that that both schemes require
analysis.

C.

The “Focus” of the ATS

Based on Justice Alito’s determination about the “focus” of the ATS,
Kiobel may have properly incorporated the “focus test.” 238 However,
courts and judges do not always agree on what the focus of a statute is.239
Additionally, some courts have acknowledged that under Morrison, a
statute may have multiple focuses.240 Below are two alternative
applications of Morrison to the ATS. The first is the congressional
motivation approach, and the second is the “focus of the focus”
approach.

1. Congressional Motivation
The “focus” of the ATS might be the purpose behind its enactment.
If that purpose was to remedy torts, which, if left unattended, could
threaten the United States’ standing with other nations, 241 such torts
would provide ATS jurisdiction. If that purpose was to become a fully
functioning member of the international community, 242 addressing torts,
which, if acted upon, demonstrated the United States’ commitment to the
international community, would provide ATS jurisdiction. Such a
“focus” would direct courts to play a role in the international legal order
and exercise universal jurisdiction as courts of international law.

2. Focus of the Focus
If the “focus” test is applied in a way that requires analysis of
individual violations of international law, the test would produce
different focuses depending on the violation at issue. 243 Accordingly,
different types of United States contacts would dictate whether courts
have ATS jurisdiction in claims that are based, in part, on conduct that
237

See Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 262 (2010) (analyzing the
text of § 10(b)).
238
See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1670 (Alito, J., concurring).
239
See U.S. v. Chao Fan Xu, 706 F.3d 965, 975-76 (9th Cir. 2013) (explaining that
while some courts believe RICO’s focus is on enterprise, other courts believe it is on
racketeering activity).
240
Id. (Le-Nature’s, Inc. v. Krones, Inc., 2011 WL 2112533, at *3 n. 7 (W.D. Pa. May
26, 2011) (finding that RICO may have multiple focuses)).
241
Burley, supra note 31, at 465.
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Id. at 475.
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See Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 266-67 (2010).
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took place on foreign soil. 244 Below is an illustration of how crimes
against humanity, a cause of action for ATS claims, would function
under a “focus of the focus” analysis.
In order to plead a crime against humanity, the plaintiff must allege a
“denial of fundamental rights,” as well as “the intentional targeting of an
identifiable group.” 245 The attack must be “pursuant to or in furtherance
of a State or organizational policy to commit such an attack.” 246 Kiobel,
as interpreted by some of the lower courts, requires ATS plaintiffs to
allege that the international law violation took place in the United States
in order to proceed with their claims that involve foreign conduct. 247 As
illustrated by Mujica below, simply looking to the location where
defendant committed the crime against humanity under Kiobel may not
administer the presumption against extraterritoriality in a way that
captures the “focus” of a crime against humanity—which appears to
include committing the crimes to further some policy. 248
Under a “focus of the focus” analysis, Courts would need to conduct
an analysis of the crimes against humanity statute. Crimes against
humanity, under the statute, are widespread attacks on a targeted group
to further some policy. 249 If the attack is not executed “pursuant to or in
furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such an attack,”
it would not constitute a crime against humanity. 250 The random
extermination of a group of civilians, without direction, is not a crime
against humanity. 251 Because the “policy” component of a crime against
humanity is essential, there is good reason to include it in the violation’s
“focus” under the “focus of the focus” test.
Mujica illustrates that under Morrison, different focus
determinations produce different jurisdictional results. In Mujica, the
Ninth Circuit held that two United States corporations—Occidental
Petroleum Corp. and AirScan, Inc.—could not be held liable under the
ATS, in part, because the alleged crimes against humanity occurred
outside of the United States. 252 There, plaintiffs, civilians from Santo
Domingo, pleaded that Occidental Petroleum jointly owned an oil
production facility and pipeline in Santo Domingo with the Colombian
244
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Sexual Minorities Uganda v. Lively, 960 F. Supp. 2d 304, 317 (D. Mass. 2013).
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Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 7, July 17, 1998, 2187
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Government. 253 AirScan was employed by Occidental Petroleum to
protect the facility and pipeline from “left-wing insurgents.” 254 In order
to secure the pipeline, the Colombian military carried out a raid in Santo
Domingo. 255 The military received assistance from Occidental Petroleum
and AirScan. 256 Occidental provided the military with a room to plan the
raid, and AirScan piloted planes, paid for by Occidental Petroleum, in
order to identify targets in Santo Domingo and determine where to
deploy troops. 257 The Colombian Air Force, with the assistance of the
United States corporations, dropped cluster bombs on a town in Santo
Domingo. 258 Afterwards, the Colombian military entered the town and
ransacked its homes. 259 The explosions destroyed homes, killed
seventeen civilians, and injured twenty-five. 260 The Ninth Circuit decided
that because the alleged crime against humanity took place in Santo
Domingo, and not in the United States, the claim was barred on
extraterritoriality grounds. 261 Additionally, the court declared that the
only connection the defendants had to the United States was their status
as Untied States corporations, and that, in itself, was not enough to
displace the presumption. 262
Mujica would have possibly turned out differently if the courts,
operating under a “focus of the focus” test, decided that the focus of a
crime against humanity is “an attack pursuant to a State or organizational
policy.” If the court decided so, United States contacts relevant to
assessing ATS jurisdiction would include those contacts that are related
to the motivating policy behind the attack. In Mujica, the policy behind
the attack was financial—protecting a valuable asset. 263 Occidental
Petroleum, located in Los Angeles, and AirScan, located in Florida,
assisted the Colombian government to reap financial benefits, which
resulted from the protection of a significant asset in Santo Domingo. 264
The financial benefit gained from the defendants’ involvement in the raid
would primarily flow to the corporations’ headquarters in Los Angeles

253

Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1168 (C.D. Cal.
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and Florida. 265 Here, under a “focus of the focus” test, courts would
consider contacts related to the underlying policy of the attack and find
that those financial contacts flowed to recipients in the United States—
specifically to Los Angeles and Florida corporations. 266 Accordingly, the
contacts that would matter for the presumption would not be
“extraterritorial,” and plaintiffs would be able to proceed with their
claim.

3. The Most Sensible “Focus” to Apply
It is unclear which “focus” of the ATS would provide for the best
results. Indeed, the courts have pointed out that it is not always clear how
Morrison’s logic translates to other statutory schemes. 267
It may be most sensible for the “focus” of the ATS to be
international law violations. If this were the case, the Kiobel test would
stay the same, as the location where the international law violation was
committed would govern whether courts have ATS jurisdiction.
The “congressional motivation” approach presents difficulties. If the
purpose of the ATS is to prevent international conflict, and courts had to
determine which ATS claims pose such conflicts, judges would be forced
to enter into “a delicate field of international relations,” which Congress
“alone has the facilities necessary to make fairly such an important
policy decision . . . .” 268 Forcing judges to make decisions about which
claims provoke international conflict would potentially conflict with the
presumption against extraterritoriality’s purpose to prevent “unintended
clashes between our laws and the laws of other nations which could
result in international discord.” 269
If the “focus” of the ATS is for the United States to become a fully
functioning member of the international community, judges would
inappropriately determine the extent of the United States’ international
involvement, against the separation of powers doctrine. 270 Moreover,
judges are not equipped to decide the effects that a course of action will
have on the United States’ standing with the international community. 271
The “focus of the focus” test also presents difficulties. Investigating
the “focus” of each ATS cause of action would create confusion among
the circuits, as judges would inevitably disagree as to what each
265
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U.S. v. Chao Fan Xu, 706 F.3d 965, 975 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing In re Toyota Motor
Corp., 785 F. Sup. 2d 883, 914 (C.D. Cal. 2011)).
268
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013).
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particular violation’s focus is. Indeed, in Morrison itself, the majority
and concurrence disagreed as to the “focus” of section 10b-5 of the
Securities and Exchange Act. 272 Each international law under the ATS
would create the potential for the same kind of disagreement, and the
United States courts would inconsistently apply the presumption against
extraterritoriality.
Moreover, not all international law violations have a unified
statutory scheme. For instance, with regards to crimes against humanity,
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (RSICC) and the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) are
broader than the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda (ICTR). 273
The ICTR defines crimes against humanity as “a widespread or
systematic attack . . . on national, political, ethnic, racial, or religious
grounds.” 274 The RSICC and the ICTY allow prosecution for crimes
against humanity when they are directed at “any civilian population.”275
When determining what the focus of an international law violation is
under a “focus of the focus” approach, it would be difficult to decide
which international statute to use, especially when the different statutes
would lead judges to infer different focuses.
At the same time, because the ATS derives substantive significance
from various international law violations, it may be ill-suited for a
singular test, like Kiobel, that treats all violations the same. 276 Moreover,
if international law violations are not individually examined, the ATS’s
“jurisdictional reach” will not always match its “underlying substantive
grasp.” 277

VI.

CONCLUSION

The Kiobel test presents many issues. The lower courts, for example,
have provided conflicting and questionable applications of the
presumption against extraterritoriality. The two Kiobel inquiries, as a
result of their ambiguity, give lower courts the flexibility to use the
272
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presumption against extraterritoriality to deny claims brought against
MNCs choosing to operate their businesses to the detriment of foreign
nationals. This is troubling, especially in cases like Mastafa, 278 where a
court can decide that the conduct of a United States corporation does not
touch and concern territory of the United States with enough force. It is
important that the Supreme Court provide more guidance on how to
administer the presumption against extraterritoriality within the context
of the ATS. This guidance should include an explanation of how
Morrison’s “focus” test will function in ATS cases.
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See Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 770 F.3d 170, 189 (2d Cir. 2014).

